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Fregel vs the Masters of Suspicion: A Critical Notice of
Robert Brandom’s A Spirit of Trust 
Rorty claims to have once remarked to Sellars, “if a man be perverse enough to bind
the spirit of Hegel in the fetters of Carnap, how shall  he find readers?”1 If  Sellars’s
epistemology in his Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is “the spirit of Hegel found in
the fetters of Carnap,” then correspondingly, Brandom’s A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of the
Phenomenology is ‘the spirit of Hegel bound in the fetters of Frege’. Yet whereas Sellars’s
creative synthesis of Hegel and Carnap is implicitly at work in what he does and how he
does it, Brandom’s synthesis is fully explicit: at every stage along the way he informs us
how  he  is  constructing  a  version  of  Hegel  that  can  brought  into  productive
Critical notice of Robert Brandom, A Spirit of Trust. A Reading of Hegel’s Ph...
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-2 | 2020
1
conversation with a version of Frege. The result may be, like Kripke’s Wittgenstein,
more Brandom than Hegel. Much as Kripke’s Wittgenstein has given us “Kripkenstein,”
so too Brandom’s Frege-Hegel hybrid gives us “Fregel.”2 
1 As A Spirit of Trust is subtitled “A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology” we must ask: what
does he mean by a “reading”? We are not being offered an interpretation that conforms
to accepted standards of scholarship, not least of which because Brandom brings too
much of himself – his concerns, problems, and voice – to the table. This is not at all a
criticism;  on  the  contrary,  this  is  what  must  happen  to  make  texts  come  alive  in
response to a historical situation alien to that in which the text was originally written.
Re-investing old texts with new sensibilities alien to their own time and place is central
to how the canon is re-written, expanded, and kept aware of the social milieu in which
that canon is being taught, transmitted, learned, and appealed to. What Aquinas did to
Aristotle to make him consistent with the truths of Catholic doctrine, Brandom does to
Hegel to make him consistent with the methods of analytic philosophy of language. 
2 This brings us to the second point: what kind of reading is this? As I see it, there are
two  different  themes  at  work  here.  The  first  is  a  realization  that  Hegel’s  central
concern, following Kant, is with what Westphal (2011) calls “cognitive semantics”: a
description of the most generic features that a conceptual framework must have in
order that it is possible for rational subjects to make assertions about how the world is
and should be.  The second is  that  the methods of  analytic  philosophy of  language,
above all those of Frege (but also Tarski, Dummett, Kaplan, Lewis, Quine, etc.) are the
right tools for a “rational reconstruction” (as Brandom calls it) of Hegel’s project. In
this  sense,  Brandom’s  reading  of  Hegel  is  focused  on  Hegel’s  semantics,  by  the
standards of what 20th century analytic philosophy counts as semantics. 
3 The “rational  reconstruction”  that  turns  Hegel  into  Fregel  is  framed by  what  20th
century  analytic  philosophy  has  determined  counts  as  rational,  involving  both
inclusions and exclusions.3 While Brandom justifies this as (in his terms) a de re rather
than de dicto reading (p. 308-9), Brandom’s own hermeneutic biases will be evident to
philosophers familiar with traditions other than 20th-century Anglophone philosophy
of language. Brandom’s Hegel is not the Hegel who inspired Marx or Dewey – one may
not be able to see, from Brandom’s text, why Adorno was right to call Das Kapital “the
phenomenology of anti-spirit.” But by excluding so much of Hegel, Brandom is able to
highlight  a  line  of  thought  that  would  be  obscured  by  other  considerations  and
interpretations: the conceptual interdependence of cognitive semantics and pragmatics
for how we must think about the relationship between thoughts and things. 
4 A decisive step taken at the outset of SoT is what Brandom calls “semantic descent.”
The thought here is that we should read Hegel’s philosophical categories, and above all
the categories of Verstand and Vernunft, as metalinguistic concepts. They do not have
their  own  free-standing  intelligible  content;  rather  they  are  ways  of  talking  about
ordinary,  empirical-level  concepts  like  “dog”  and  “tree.”  This  does  not  mean,
importantly, that Brandom’s Hegel abjures metaphysics entirely. It is to say, instead,
that Brandom reconstructs Hegel’s rehabilitation of metaphysics, in response to Kant’s
critique  of  metaphysics,  as  itself a  semantic  thesis.  We  cannot  have  determinate
thoughts about things if we have no possible cognitive grip on determinate things in
themselves. The concepts of thoughts and things are, in Brandom’s idiom, “reciprocally
sense-dependent” – one cannot have the concept of one without having the concept of
the  other.  We  would  not  be  entitled  to  regard  ourselves  as  having  determinate
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thoughts at  all  –  thoughts with content or  sense (Sinn) –  if  we could not have any
cognitive  awareness  or  grip  on determinate  things  in  themselves.4 Nevertheless,  in
denying that Hegel’s overarching philosophical project has its own intelligible content
independent of empirical concepts, Brandom’s Hegel may seem quite different from the
versions of Hegel that have shaped much of 20th century Continental philosophy. 
5 As with Brandom’s other magnum opus, Making It Explicit (1996), the account of Hegel
depends  on  a  system  of  fine-grained  distinctions.  For  this  reason,  understanding
Brandom’s Hegel means understanding the distinctions and how they are employed.
(Fortunately, there is a helpful chart on p. 266.) The most basic distinction is between
semantics and pragmatics: the content of assertions and their force. On the semantic
side,  Brandom  retains  the  Fregean  distinction  between  sense  and  reference  but
develops  a  fascinating  Hegelian  (Fregelian?)  criticism  of  Frege’s  version  of  this
distinction. (I shall return to this below.) On the pragmatics side, Brandom builds upon
his  distinction  from  MIE  between  normative  statuses  and  normative  attitudes.
Normative statuses fall into two camps: authority (the status of making a move in the
space  of  reasons)  and responsibility  (the  status  of  accepting that  a  move has  been
made). Normative attitudes fall into two camps: acknowledgment (1st person attitudes)
and attributions (2nd and 3rd person attitudes).  All of these are reciprocally sense-
dependent, meaning that one cannot fully grasp one without the other; authority and
responsibility are reciprocally sense-dependent; acknowledgment and attribution are
reciprocally  sense-dependent;  and  normative  statues  and  normative  attitudes  are
reciprocally sense-dependent. The project of Brandom’s Hegel is to demonstrate the
interlocking sense-dependence of these distinctions through the insufficiency of any
semantics which lacks them. The demonstration of this insufficiency is the succession
of shapes of consciousness in the Phenomenology. 
6 In  these  terms  Brandom  diagnoses  the  main  pathology  of  rationality  as  authority
without responsibility, what Hegel calls independence or mastery. In Fregelian terms,
the fundamental problem with the command-obey model of discursive interaction is
essentially normative-pragmatic: the master is conceptualized as having full authority
with  no  concomitant  responsibility,  the  servant  is  conceptualized  as  having  full
responsibility  with  no  concomitant  authority,  and  these  are  deeply  incoherent
concepts. It is the need to accept the interdependence of authority and responsibility
that  drives  the  dialectic  past  the  master/servant  relationship  towards  a  more
egalitarian and inclusive community based on an adequate semantics. 
7 This in turn raises the question: what is the criterion of a sufficient semantics, such
that we can know whether a semantic theory is sufficient or insufficient? As Brandom
sees it, thought must be determinate: there must be specific content, at least potentially
discernable to us as finite thinkers, about what we are asserting and negating when we
endorse and deny. The determinacy of reference depends on the determinacy of sense.
Without determinateness, we do not have sense or meaning at all; there would be no
intelligible  distinction  between  sense  and  nonsense.  What  Brandom’s  Hegel  urges,
then, is that we should accept the progressive explication of the conditions of thought
and action developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit in order for us to understand how
there can be determinate thoughts about determinate things at all in the first place.
This is, no doubt, a demanding claim; but A Spirit of Trust is a demanding book. 
8 In a short critical notice, it is impossible to do justice to Brandom’s monumental work.
Instead  I  shall  focus  on  two  specific  themes  that,  I  believe,  illustrate  the  general
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character  of  Brandom’s  book and make it  a  valuable  contribution to  contemporary
philosophy. The first is how Brandom constructs his Aufhebung of Hegel and Frege; the
second is his engagement with the “hermeneutics of suspicion”: Marx, Nietzsche, and
Freud. 
9 In  an  important  sense,  analytic  philosophy  was  born  out  of  Frege’s  rejection  of
psychologism  (Kusch  1995).  Thoughts  –  determinate  senses  or  Sinne –  are  not
psychological  entities and have nothing to do with any empirical  science.  Brandom
retains  this  anti-psychologistic  bias  (for  the  most  part)  but  argues  that  the  right
version of anti-psychologism for semantics is not Frege’s but Hegel’s. As Brandom sees
it, the crucial move that underpins Hegelian semantics is a non-psychological theory of
concepts.5 By  construing  conceptual  content  in  terms  of  incompatibility,  Brandom
helps himself to the idea that conceptuality is modality: modal relations are conceptual
relations and conversely. Hence we are to see the same conceptual content at work in
both alethic modal claims about what cannot be the case and in deontic modal claims
about what should not be the case: it cannot be the case that H2O does not boil at 100
degrees Centigrade (ceteris paribus), and no one should believe that H2O does not boil at
100 degrees Centigrade (ceteris paribus). Alethic modal claims and deontic modal claims
are  reciprocally  sense-dependent;  one  cannot  be  fully  cognitively  aware  of  either
without the other.6 
10 The sense/reference distinction is,  of  course,  Fregean, but Brandom’s is  not,  or not
wholly  so.  Brandom’s  audacious  innovation  here  is  to  show  how  Frege’s  sense/
reference distinction is not just Kantian, but Kantian in the wrong way: it is Kantian in
the sense that renders it vulnerable to a Hegelian critique. The spirit of this gesture –
turning Hegel’s critique of Kant against Frege insofar as Frege is Kant’s 20th century
heir  –  is  certainly not  unfamiliar  to  students  of  Wittgenstein or  Sellars.  But  unlike
Wittgenstein  or  Sellars,  Brandom  shows  in  painstaking  detail  how  to  develop  a
Hegelian critique of Frege through a close reading of Phenomenology of Spirit. The crux of
this reading is that Frege, like Kant, is a philosopher of Verstand, where Verstand (and
Vernunft)  are  understood  as  metalinguistic  categories,  or  ways  of  thinking  about
empirical, ground-level concepts. Verstand articulates sense and reference as static or
fixed, and precisely because of it, cannot account for how embodied beings in space and
time arrive at their awareness of senses and references. Just as Hegel thought that Kant
was  dogmatic  (in  denying of  the  possibility  of  knowledge of  things  in  themselves),
Brandom thinks that Frege is dogmatic (in affirming that cognitive awareness of Sinne
has nothing to do with human sociality or history). 
11 By  contrast,  the  metalinguistic  category  of  Vernunft is  dynamic  and  historical: the
determinacy  of  sense  and  reference  is  not  given  or  fixed  but  negotiated  and  re-
negotiated both synchronically and diachronically. Just as we 21st century scientists
and philosophers hold that  the terms “phlogiston” and “ether” have senses but no
referents,  our successors  will  decide the referents  of  our discourse.  It  will  be their
rational  reconstruction  of  our  linguistic  practices  –  a  process  that  Brandom  calls
“recollection” – that determines whether or not our terms really had referents or only
senses.  Thus  the  very  distinction  between  sense  and  reference  is  essentially  and
ineliminably social and historical: our own understanding of which terms have sense
and reference depends on our ongoing social interactions that are historically shaped
and mediated. The process of realizing that determinacy is necessarily dynamic and
progressive is the process of making determinate content become for us what it has
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always been in itself. The argument for understanding the sense/reference distinction
in the Fregelian framework of Vernunft depends on observing the insufficiency of any
semantics that tries to make good on the Fregean framework of Verstand. 
12 I want to turn now to Brandom’s engagement with three of the most important post-
Hegelian  thinkers  who  are  associated  (rightly  or  wrongly)  with  criticisms  of  the
Enlightenment: Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, the trio that Ricœur called “the masters of
suspicion.” In Brandom’s reconstruction of  the Phenomenology,  Marx,  Nietzsche,  and
Freud  enter  the  philosophical  scene  quite  far  along  in  the  unfolding  of  Fregel’s
semantics and pragmatics. We have, at this point, discovered that determinate content
is  intelligible  only  in  light  of  normative  statuses  (authority  and responsibility)  and
normative  attitudes  (attribution  and acknowledgement).  But  we  have  not  yet
determined the exact relation between normative statuses and normative attitudes.
Here lies a puzzle: which of them has priority over the other? Are normative statuses
fixed and given in advance of the attitudes taken toward them? Or are attitudes prior,
and  statuses  the  result  of  our  self-  and  other-directed  attributions  and
acknowledgments? 
13 Fregel  sees  the  dialectic  of  the  hero  and  the  valet  in  these  terms:  the  valet  or
Kammerdiener is one who reduces normative statues to normative attitudes, whereas
the hero upholds the independence of statues from attitudes. But in a puzzling twist, it
is the masters of suspicion who are cast as the valet (p. 560-5).7 The reasons for this
casting (or mis-casting) are not entirely clear, but it has something to do with how each
of them offers a causal explanation for why we are beholden to the norms we espouse,
which is to say, our norms are not fully under our control. We have less autonomy than
we think we do; the norms we identify as ours, that we take ourselves to be responsible
to,  are  mere  appearance  –  shadows  cast  by  some  non-normative  reality  which  is,
however, amenable to causal explanation. 
14 Unlike other productive oppositions in the Phenomenology, the critique presented by the
masters of suspicion is refuted rather than sublated – we are told that the reciprocal
sense-dependence of normative statuses and normative attitudes upholds the hero and
refutes the valet, because the valet attempted a reductive explanation of impersonal
ideals  to  personal  motives.  While  this  much  may  be  true  as  a  reading  of  the
Phenomenology, casting the masters of suspicion as heirs to the valet unfairly blunts the
force of their critiques. This matters for the viability of Fregelian semantics because the
determinacy  of  senses  and  referents  is  conceptualized,  using  the  metalinguistic
category of Vernunft, as essentially historical and social. For Fregel, the recollections
that gather together what has been said and construct it in terms of what should have
been said are necessarily progressive – they are acts that transform contingency into
necessity. But who is empowered to make this determination? Who is included in the
community of speakers who attribute to themselves the authority to determine the
meaning of the past? There are deep questions about power, dominance, and violence
that  are  posed  (in  quite  different  and  not  obviously  compatible  ways)  by  Marx,
Nietzsche, and Freud. By casting them as the valet, whose critique is more refuted than
sublated, Fregel prevents a challenge from being raised as to the sufficiency of Vernunft
for semantics. 
15 The complex relation between normative statuses and normative attitudes also has, for
Fregel,  a  historical  dimension  that  maps  neatly  onto  the  familiar  succession:
premodern, modern, and postmodern forms of life. The premodern shape of a world is
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exemplified by Fregel’s Antigone, in which the conflict between Creon and Antigone is
described  in  terms  of  an  opposition  between  incompatible  normative  statuses  (the
wrongness  of  honoring  a  traitor,  the  rightness  of  burying  a  brother)  that  have
determinate content fixed in advance of attitudes taken towards those statues. Thus
the premodern stage is  the stage of  heroism and of  tragedy.  This  gives way to the
modern form of  life,  in  which the dependence of  normative statuses  on normative
attitudes is discovered, and this enables the discovery of genuine autonomy: that we
are  genuinely  committed  to  those  norms  only  which  we  accept  as  expressing  our
choices as to what we shall be committed to. This modern form of life is the age of
individualism, and also perhaps (depending on how one reads the masters of suspicion)
of cynicism. But what we discover in the Phenomenology is that the independence of
normative  attitudes  from  normative  statuses  is  just  as  unintelligible  as  the
independence of normative statues from normative attitudes. The recognition of the
constitutive  interdependence  of  normative  statues  and  normative  attitudes
(“reciprocal sense-dependence”) ushers in the postmodern age, or what Fregel calls
“trust” – although it must be stressed that this is “postmodern” only in the sense that it
sublates the opposition between antiquity and modernity as Fregel understands them.8 
16 I would like now to raise the following question: if A Spirit of Trust is the spirit of Hegel
bound  in  the  fetters  of  Carnap,  for  whom  is  it  written?  To  what  extent  does  its
forbidding length (almost 800 pages) and writing style impose such a high burden that
very  few  will  have  both  sufficient  training  and  sufficient  time  to  read  it?  While
professors at  highly prestigious departments will  certainly find time to read it,  the
same might not be said of the vast bulk of professional philosophers: those with high
teaching loads, demanding service commitments, and/or complicated personal lives.
There is, in other words, scope for a hermeneutics of suspicion with regard to Spirit of
Trust as a speech act in itself with regard the material community in which this speech
act takes place. I suggested above that Fregel neutralizes the masters of suspicion by
miscasting them as the Kammerdiener, and thereby evades the question as to whether
their hermeneutics of suspicion might undermine the entire project of recollection. A
structurally similar problem afflicts the text qua speech act as a whole: it is presented
to us as if the space of reasons is unaffected by capital, desire, and power. Though A
Spirit of Trust articulates a postmodern ethical community structured by relations of
trust and care, it ignores the material barriers and political exclusions that prevent
such a community from being actualized – even with regard to the book’s intended
audience.
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NOTES
1. Rorty’s  Introduction to the 1997 edition of EPM. Rorty ruefully notes that Sellars was not
amused.
2. I  have  borrowed  this  from  Bowie  (2006),  though  unlike  Bowie  I  do  not  emphasize  the
importance of music for Hegel’s theory of meaning.
3. This does not show up in what Brandom discuses, but rather in what he ignores: Brandom’s
Hegel has much to say about assertions but nothing to say about religion or music. 
4. Brandom distinguishes himself from 19th century “all is Mind” Anglo-American idealism in
part by insisting that thoughts and things are reciprocally sense-dependent but not reciprocally
reference-dependent. The existence of what we refer to does not depend on our languages for
talking about it. 
5. Brandom does not specify what would count as a psychological theory of concepts, so it is not
clear if “non-psychological” is to be construed narrowly as simply “non-Cartesian” or broadly as
“non-empirical.”
6. However,  to  preserve  the  sort  of  modest  realism  that  passes  as  mere  common  sense  in
Anglophone philosophy, Brandom insists that alethic modal claims are not reference-dependent
on deontic modal claims: what is the case in the world is independent of what is claimed about it. 
7. One reason why this is puzzling, perhaps ironic, is that the valet reduces all heroic deeds to
egoistic motivations – think here of French moralists like La Rochefoucauld. By contrast, Marx,
Nietzsche, and Freud all emphasize that even our egoism is mere appearance to be explained in
terms of the conflict between capital and labor, or the inability to affirm life as will to power, or a
denial of unresolved family romance. 
8. Fregel’s  “postmodern”  age  of  trust has  nothing  to  do  with  the  postmodernity  of  literary
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